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lich's contention that anirrals experience 
pain but do not suffer. But dead anirrals, 
those being killed humanely (theoretically),()piniQn 
and those killed a manent ago and therefore 
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It rray well be possible to develop ani­
rrals, or provide situations for anirrals, 
which are pain-free, and to yet have it be 
the case that such developnent and the making 
of such situations are imroral acts and the 
implicated anirrals exploited. 
In his critical notice of R. G. Frey's 
Rights, Killing and Suffering: Horal Vege­
tarianism and Applied Ethics, in these p3.ges, 
James Nelson cites Frey's use in his book of 
James Rachels' distinction between "being 
alive" and "having a life." Nelson ccmnents 
that Frey's use of this distinction brings to 
mind Regan's notion of a "subject of a life." 
According to Nelson, Frey in his book favors 
the "concerned individual" approach to issues 
of factory fanning Oller the "rroral vegetari­
an" approach. Concerned individuals, Frey 
holds, work to imprOlle conditions on factory 
fanns, lessening the suffering of fann ani­
mals by diverting resources "into the devel­
opnent of new and relatively painless methods 
of breeding, feeding, and killing anirrals. of 
new pain-preventing and pain-killing drugs, of 
new types of tranquilizers and sedatives, 
etc." and "seek further appropriate break­
throughs in genetic engineering." 
'IWo considerations in Peter Singer's 
Animal Liberation bothered me. The first was 
his drawing of the line for equal considera­
tion of species' interests just "above" the 
rrollusc. The other, and it is this point 
that. is brought freshly to mind by Nelson's 
review, was his decision to give less consi­
deration to the question of killing anirrals 
than to that of their suffering. It seemed 
to me that this tactic clearly related to his 
insistence that rroral change is to be effec­
ted first by rational argument in preference 
to any affective approach. . Those who rray 
have read my "Opinion" piece in BTS #2 will 
perhaps remember my remarks aboutIvan Il­
not existing as live anirrals do not experi­
ence pain and do not suffer, at least in this 
world of which we have sane knowledge. But, 
for me, it has always been evident that being 
killed is the rrost intense form of p3.in or 
suffering even though death itself is not 
felt. To expose an anirral to suffering or 
cruelty and then to kill it is to doubly 
a:rnpound the rroral rralfeasance. I am no 
spiritualist, but my irragination has long 
autanatically insisted that the full quantum 
of death' s pain-equivalence is scm:mow irrmed.­
iately rranifest just the other side of the 
boundary between life and death. The crime 
of killing is great, though no voice be 
heard. 
Is it conceivable that to cause pain or 
suffering is rrorally wrong but that to kill 
is not? Perhaps it is also rrorally wrong to 
kill humans, rrorally considerable beings, but 
only wrong to cause animals to suffer cruel­
ly? 
It seems to me that part of the diffi­
culty rrany have in assigning rroral wrong to 
killing anirrals must rest in the difficulty 
of conceiving of any experience at all in 
life which has just in the manent ceased to 
be living. That which does not exist cannot 
either suffer or hurt and cannot be the ob­
ject of rroral action. By killing, in the 
case of anirrals, actions are substantially 
freed of rroral relevance. Certainly the idea 
of humane slaughter rests at least in part 
upon a difference in the value placed upon 
pain-free life in a:rnparison with non-exist­
ence. I find myself wanting to speak of the 
"pain of non-existence." . 
Can it be that sane of the contell1POrary 
resistance to holding that killing anirrals is 
rrorally wrong originates in the anti-reli­
gious? Being that the injunction not to 
kill, which can be extended to refer also to 
anirrals, is taken to be a rroral/religious 
injunction vouched for by Moses' rep..1ted 
experience of God? 
Whatever rray be the true relationship of 
these rratters, we should continue, I think, 
to be very wary of rroral systems which do not 
also prohibit the killing of anirrals. The 
killing of anirrals is in itself a rroral 
wrong. In addition, schemes to get around 
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the irnrrorality of the act by providing ani­
mals with pain-free lives to the p:>int of 
death must be resisted. "Pain-free unto 
death" gives the sense of it. When anilTh.'l.ls 
are deprived of the ordinary pains of their 
natura:' lives, that is a cruelty. Further­
more, the destruction of an animal' s capacity 
to feel pain and/or the suppression of the 
behaviors that in animals express pain, so 
that the animal, it ~nay be claimed, is not in 
pain when in reality it is experiencing in­
tense pain, are not lIDral, no matter what the 
calculus applied to whatever. pain/pleasure 
quotient is rranifest only in the circum­
scribed lIDffient. 
I have been surprised by Evelyn Pluhar's 
suggestion in "On the Genetic Manipulation of 
Animals" (BTS, vol. 1, no. 3) that the chance 
that the new biotechnological techniques will 
be abused is "exceedingly slim." I think 
Pluhar is too sanguine in this opinion.· Ivan 
Illich, in Medical Nemesis, documents exten­
sive abuse through practices so taken for 
granted that their employment does not even 
depend up:m any clear point of lIDral choice 
such that discussions by philosophers would 
likely arise or have much impact up:m any 
course being followed. 
The capacity of society and its medicine 
to suppress the expressions (Darwin) of pain 
and to suppress pain itself is already far 
advanced. If there is no felt pain, but the 
tissue Qr physiological functioning of the 
animal is damaged nevertheless, then if by 
,-means of the suppression of pain or suppres­
sion of pain's expression the animal is able 
to be held in a way which overcomes any I!IOral 
objection based on cruelty, but is thereby 
led to death, that is an irrunoral act. This 
is why we need not only I!IOral philosophy but 
lIDral philosophy and science to work out the 
exchanges (as Susan Isen puts it in "Beyond 
Abolition: Ethical Exchanges with Animals in 
Agriculture," BTS, vol. 1., no. 4) in a world 
governed by an ethic that asserts that it is 
wrong to kill animals. Such a wodd is envi­
sioned by George Abbe in Negavit. 
Animals and humanity must find cornlIDn 
cause. The means whereby humanity confines 
and restricts its own members are developed 
and perfected in research into the confine­
ment of non-human species. Parallel psycho­
logical and propaganda techniques ir:mre the 
hwnan person to his/her restricted situation 
at work and in an increasing assortment of 
life situations, including the house and yard 
in which the occupant is "ontained more and 
more indoors, more and lIDre in the absence of 
soil, vegetation and animal life, lIDre and 
more connected to a high-tech "life support 
systerr." whose plug at some point may be 
pulled by the prograrrmers of politics or 
economics. It is insane to justify explora­
tions which likely will be, and are being, 
used against human freedom. .And it is iln­
moral to advance the confinement, or adjust­
ment to confinement, of animals. This con­
nection is a principal reason why the desti­
nies of animals and hwnan persons are now so 
substantially intertwined. 
IS THE MERELY PAIN- FREE LIFE 
(MORALLY CONSIDERABLE, 
NEVERTHELESS) 
A LIFE WORTH LIVING? 
When the integrity of animals I natural 
ways of living remain intact, then those 
animals "have a life." They are the "subject 
of a life." They are "life-that-wills-to­
live in the midst of life-that-wills-to-live" 
(Schweitzer), a formulation not easily im­
proved upon. This does not mean that finally 
a I!IOrally relevant distinction can success­
fully be drawn between "being alive" and 
"having a life." If confined and pain-sup­
pressed animals, whose natural ways are not 
intact, no longer "have a life" but are 
alive, nevertheless, then their killing re­
mains irnlIDral, perhaps even particularly so, 
since one evil is compounded (not brought to 
an end) by another. 
These considerations are not to be un­
derstood in a way that aligns them with any 
religious, social scientific, legal, or psy-
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chiatric insistence upon the preservation/ex­ to yourself. No matb>..r that e ostensible 
tension of life at all costs (particularly to goal of new developnents in animal husbandry 
the plblic treasury and clients?). Death is is, through focx1, to provi e for the well­
llOre acceptable than that. Death is neither being of humanity, the rts of confinEmmt 
to be hurried on its way nor grotesquely come to have wider g:>lication. This is not 
forestalled. But the acceptability of death to say auything againb-t what has since Kohr 
is not ither to be understood in a way that and Schumacher become known as human scale in 
conspires with sane new technology of ying living or as voluntary simplicity, for these 
and grief or ligns acceptance of death With are genuine and ecological ideals. But the 
indifference toward one's own ving of a technology of the ("estriction of the organism 
ilie or toNard the lives of others. has nothing in COIlIIDI1 with such true ideals. 
Nor, really, does the answer to the classic 
Herding native peoples onto reservdtions Buddhist questi00 concerning hO'N' the fish in 
or "hernelands," cattle into fee:llots, trees the bottle is to be freed: '"11"1er,=, it is 
and shrubbery into "landscaped" plazas ar free, " suggesting thdt freedem is wholly 
all ctions that cleitr the terrain. Into th inner in nature. We know that while there is 
clearings spcead houses, streets, cafes, meaning in thp. idea of inner freedem, and 
gasoline stations, silicoll chip f ctories, know that it is possible to have an inflated 
video arcade, and other structures 1 con- notion of what is reqllired to be free, such 
J.TW1g rc:wing human population. '!he llEaning as there is in the ideii of inner 
process goes on also at the ex nse of c~p­ freedom does not makp. it good to have irnpri­
land, already a d~splacemen leading to ces­ soned Gandhi, Aurobindo, or Thoreau. Simi­
tricted woodland and other natural habitat. larly, there is no virtue at aU in the 
Fairly hr long, sane national parks, open confinement of animals. Nothing gocx1 has or 
space, a bit of faonland, some reservations will c.:orne of it, though the consequences in 
will remain. At that point, and we are suf­ the lives of animals and human persons be 
ficiently close to that p:U.nt now to discern "f)'linless. " 
the trends, these uses and this "setting 
asi e" which is also a ruling out, will be 
seen even llOre clearly than t present to 
have accomplished an enclosure, an entrapnent ANIMALS. 
of humanity. At the individual level or at 
the level of the family, thi entrapnent is Do they matter? 
alreatly far alo~: people cut off from coun­ An exl"itinl{ n ...w awar... n 'I' 
tryside, fresh air, and clean water, kids and unfuhlln~ alul1Il our rl'latlfm,hll' 
"II II alII mal-. ,Inel I hI" n"t of I h,'companion animal contained by dangerous city 
nJlllr;11 ""rlol 1~I';1I1 ;111"'11 II :11
streets, 1e outside nO'N' so impoverished that THE A!\J:'otALS' AGE!':DA. 
the cnvirorurent has bec:aiE very substanti lly 
TilE ANJ~tALS' AGE:"DA j{1\ ,"inside. Accanpanying the self-entrapnent of 
1'1111 nl'w,. \ iI'''' an,l 3nh ii" 
humanity is the extinction of species, except ~lwllil anllll:ol rij.:III', ""'lfan' allol 
for genetically engineered life forms adjus­ I'n'II'IIIIIIl. ;llld aINII.11 I h" 1"'''1'1.. ]
"h" ,In' lIlaklllll all,m,11 nght, ."",ted to the restricted space and possibility IIf lit,' 1Il.II"r 1""'''' lIe ! hI' '~Il', 
of living-and even these only in th interim A \\'lIll1.E :llll\'~:,\lE, 'T"k't" 
before space canp].etely disappears. 1\ II ~: 1.·\(;AZl:\E r:::- _'!...!..'" 
'~''''-'''L''' ­
.-.---____ I AGE.""D..\ 
'-J "- YE ..,' .. - IJust as those I ew Age spiritual and '-' .~I~nlfir I~"_.!"'.fh 
lip f"r THF: ~,~ - IIlumanistic psychological ~thods of the 60's 
and 70 I s that were designed to free and make ~~~~~~~' tA/'-:~~'. : 
whole the human person have been significant­ 1 )'r. 115.00 .: ·f! 
2 )'r'S. $2~ .50 ~"" Ily co-opted by consultants to corpor tians 
:J )'rs. 5:J,.!)O I
arrl employed in an attenpt to enhance the 
C H...r ...·' 12 . St'ntl ml' " ,.;imp'" I
capacity of managerial groLlps to control the 
• "1'\' an,l mort' informal illn I 
\-'Orkplace, so will and does the developnent 
"'A~[ I
of means of growth facilitation, disease 
_ 
I 
control, and painlessness for the Iives of "TkU:T _ I 
animals in confined spaces auger the pplica­ I 
un sTAn:__ZU'__ Ition of serne of these and other similar me­
TilE A:-.'IMALS' AGE, 'DA Ithods to humanity itself. Do not do unto L P.O. llox !)~:14. W""11Ion . 'T IIhHH I_ J
 
thars tha t which you would not have be done
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